Bloggingportal is website that aggregates articles from hundreds of EU related blogs, including many of those hosted on blogactiv.eu. The project went online on 26 January 2009 and is since then probably the only comprehensive website of this kind gathering blog posts from different sources and presenting them in an accessible format online and as email newsletter.

But despite the fact that bloggingportal features now more than 900 blogs it is not developing fast enough – and maybe even not fulfilling its potential role, as Mathew explains. In fact only a good handful of the officially 30 editors do actively select and promote posts on EU affairs. The number of languages covered is limited, with most featured posts being in English.

It is unclear where the project is heading and whether it makes sense to aim for a multilingual aggregation model that is based on manual editorial selection. Would it be better if bloggingportal focusses on simply providing the best, most comprehensive and always up to date list of EU blogs – and bloggers? Or should it just call for more volunteers to join the project as editors, potentially covering more languages? Is there a future for EU blogging as such if most well known EU blogs have massively decreased the number of posts written over the past 2 years, with Twitter taking over as quick one-line-commenting-and-linking tool?

When people prefer to just send out a link with a short comment on Twitter rather than sitting down and researching content for a longer blog post on a certain EU policy matter is it then realistic to think that those same people will read and aggregate blog posts on several EU topics? Should bloggingportal simply aggregate Twitter links and not depend on a closed group of editors selecting carefully their links?

Many questions. Maybe you can help and answer some of them? Bloggingportal needs your help. Thank you!

Update: sorry, comments are closed and I can’t activate them (BlogActiv, please help!). In the meantime, please comment on Ronny’s excellent summary of the wider role of Bloggingportal.

The Commission yesterday published a press release in 23 languages but did not make available the actual Communication. Below is a the full text of the Communication for a complete infromation. You can also download the PDF version.

Please see also previous posts on this blog on the topic of SWIFT / TFTP:

• SWIFT – EU to grant USA nearly unlimited access to all EU banking data (26 November 2009)
• 5 reasons why the SWIFT deal is very bad for Europe (27 November 2009)
• Banking data: Why MEPs must say no to SWIFT agreement (7 February 2010)

A European terrorist finance tracking system: available options

COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL
1. INTRODUCTION
When the Council agreed to the conclusion of the Agreement between the European Union and the United States of America on the processing and transfer of Financial Messaging Data from the European Union to the United States for the purposes of the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program (EU-US TFTP Agreement), it also invited the Commission to submit to the European Parliament and the Council within one year after the date of entry into force of the Agreement (1 August 2010), “a legal and technical framework for extraction of data on EU territory”.2 The European Parliament has also consistently asked that in the longer term a durable, legally sound European solution to the issue of the extraction of requested data on European soil be envisaged.  The Communication “The EU Internal Security Strategy in
Action: Five steps towards a more secure Europe” also already stated that the Commission will develop a policy for the EU to extract and analyse financial messaging data held on its own territory in 2011. Given the proven effectiveness of the US TFTP, a European system is expected to contribute significantly to efforts to cut off terrorists’ access to funding and materials and follow their transactions. Reference can also be made to Article 11 of the EUUS TFTP Agreement, which states that during the course of the Agreement, the European Commission will carry out a study into the possible introduction of an equivalent EU system allowing for a more targeted transfer of data. This Communication is the first stage of the Commission’s response to this Article and the Council’s invitation. It describes the different steps the Commission has taken to move towards establishing such a “legal and technical framework”, and presents the different options under consideration for achieving this goal. It does not at this stage indicate one preferred option – it does however present the relevant points to take into consideration with respect to the options considered. Given the political importance of the issue and its legal and technical complexity, the Commission wishes to inform the Council and the European Parliament of the state of play, and trigger a debate. The Commission considers such further debate useful before presenting, on the basis of an Impact Assessment, concrete proposals.  In this context, it should be stressed that this Communication does not prejudge the proposal that the Commission will put forward. Any future proposal will take into account the discussions mentioned above and the Impact Assessment, which will be based on a study which the Commission has contracted out in the second half of 2010.  Given the impact a legislative proposal would have on fundamental rights, and in particular on data protection, the Impact Assessment will pay particular attention to the necessity and proportionality of any measures which the Commission may propose. To that end the Commission will follow the guidance provided in its Communication on the strategy for the implementation of the Charter of Fundamental rights. In addition, the Impact Assessment will provide the necessary technical background material, as well as a detailed assessment of all available options. These issues have already been discussed with many stakeholders in this area, including Member States authorities, data protection authorities, Europol and the designated provider. The final results of the study mentioned above will be available only by the end of this year. To support the preparation of an Impact Assessment, the European Commission has organised three expert meetings with
the same stakeholders, as well as the U.S. authorities involved in running the TFTP. The options discussed in this Communication build on the preliminary results of the study and the discussions in these expert meetings.
2. GOALS OF ESTABLISHING AN EU TERRORIST FINANCE TRACKING SYSTEM
There are two main reasons for establishing an EU terrorist finance tracking system (TFTS):

• The system must provide an effective contribution to the fight against terrorism and its financing within the European Union;
• The system must contribute to limiting the amount of personal data transferred to thirdcountries.
• The system should provide for the processing of the data required to run it on EU territory, subject to EU data protection principles and legislation.

In the United States, the Terrorist Finance Tracking Programme (TFTP) has proven to present significant added value to the fight against terrorism and its financing, benefitting not only U.S. authorities, but also the authorities of the Member States of the European Union and third countries. The recent review of the EU-US TFTP Agreement6 confirmed that since the establishment of the TFTP in the U.S., more than 2500 reports have been shared with the
authorities of third countries, the overwhelming majority of which (1700) have been shared with the European Union. The effectiveness of the U.S. programme and its value for combating terrorism and its financing have also been confirmed in the two reports presented by Judge Bruguière, who was appointed by the European Commission in 2008 to review the programme. The TFTP derived information which was provided to EU authorities included significant leads in relation to a number of high profile (attempted) terrorist attacks, such as the Madrid and London attacks, the 2006 plot to bring down transatlantic flights using liquid explosives, and the 2007 attempted attack on U.S. interests in Germany. The EU Review Team also concluded that it had been provided with “convincing indications of the added
value of TFTP to the fight against terrorism and its financing”. Given these experiences, there are solid grounds for believing an EU TFTS will also provide significant added value to the efforts of the EU and the Member States to combat terrorism and its financing. Whilst the effectiveness of the U.S. TFTP for combating terrorism and its financing is not in
doubt, serious concerns have been raised in relation with its consequences on the fundamental rights of citizens. These concerns are mainly centred around the fact that the implementation of the EU-US TFTP Agreement entails the provision of large amounts of personal data (“bulk data”) to U.S. authorities – the vast majority of this data concern citizens who have nothing to do with terrorism or its financing. The data is provided in bulk (on the basis of relevant data categories) rather than on an individual basis (in response to a request concerning one or more individuals), due to the fact that the provider of these data does not have the technical capacity to provide the data on an individualised basis. In addition, in order for the provider to release such data on an individualised basis, it would need to set up a dedicated search and analysis function, which is not required by its business processes, and would entail significant resource implications. Also, requesting data on an individualised basis would mean that the provider would in effect be made aware of which individuals are investigated in the context of terrorism investigations and their financial relationships. This could have an impact on the effectiveness of such investigations. To compensate for the provision of bulk data, significant safeguards have been put in place to ensure that no misuse of the data can take place, including that the provided data may only be searched and used for combating terrorism and its financing. The recent review of the EU-US TFTP Agreement has confirmed that these safeguards are indeed implemented in accordance with the provisions of the Agreement. Nevertheless, arguments have been made that the provision to a third State of such large amounts of personal data constitutes an unwarranted infringement of the fundamental rights of these citizens, taking the necessity and proportionality of this infringement into consideration. This is the reason why the Council invited the Commission to present proposals for establishing a “system for the extraction of data to take place on EU territory” –
the overall aim is to ensure that the processing of such data would take place in accordance with EU data protection legislation and principles, and in accordance with the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. In this context, it should be noted that the collection and processing of financial data by public authorities affects the right to the protection of personal data, which is enshrined in Article 16 TFEU and Article 8 of the Charter. In accordance with Article 52(1) of the Charter, any limitation of these fundamental rights must be provided by law, with the necessary precision and quality to provide foreseeability, and respect the essence of those rights. It must be limited to what is necessary and
proportional to meet a legitimate objective recognised by the Union. These principles must therefore be taken into consideration not only when taking the decision whether or not an EU TFTS should be established, but also with respect to the different available options for implementing the system. Therefore, these principles equally affect the choices to be made with respect to such issues as the scope of the system, the applicable retention periods, rights of individuals with respect to access and deletion etc. These issues are not dealt with in detail in the current Communication. They will need to be analysed fully in the Impact Assessment. Naturally, the possible establishment of a system for extracting the data on EU territory would have consequences for the existing EU-US TFTP Agreement, as recognised in Article 11 (3) of the Agreement which states that since the establishment of an EU system could substantially change the context of this Agreement, the Parties should consult to determine whether the Agreement would need to be adjusted if the European Union decides to establish such a system. All options would therefore also have an impact on the future implementation and consequent re-adjustment of the existing EU-US TFTP Agreement.
3. MAIN FUNCTIONS OF AN EU TERRORIST FINANCE TRACKING SYSTEM
One of the first issues to emerge from the discussions with stakeholders referred to above is that these stakeholders are overwhelmingly of the opinion that if an EU terrorist finance tracking system (EU TFTS) is to be established, it should be established in the interest of providing security to EU citizens. The system should not be set up just to provide relevant information to U.S. authorities – the authorities of the Member States have a real interest in the results of such a system as well. This approach also implies that whilst the U.S. TFTP could certainly provide inspiration as to how such a system could be set up, a European equivalent system would not necessarily have to copy all elements of the U.S. TFTP. Also, an EU system should be set up taking the specificity of the EU legal and administrative framework into consideration, including the respect of applicable fundamental rights as indicated above.
However, any system aimed at tracking terrorist financing in accordance with the main goals outlined above would need to foresee the implementation of the following core functions:

• preparing and issuing (legally valid) requests to the designated provider(s) of financial messaging services for the raw data to be provided to an authorised recipient or recipients. This involves determining the message categories to be requested, how often such messages should be sent, and maintaining contacts with the providers on these issues;
• monitoring and authorising requests to the designated provider(s) for such raw data. This involves verifying whether the request for the raw data have been prepared in accordance with the applicable limitations;
• receiving and storing (processing) the raw data from the designated provider(s), including the implementation of an adequate system of physical and electronic data security;
• running the actual searches on the data provided, in line with the applicable legal framework; on the basis of requests for such searches from authorities of the Member States, the U.S. or other third States on the basis of clearly defined conditions and safeguards, or on the own initiative of the authority (or authorities) entrusted with processing the data;
• monitoring and authorising the running of searches on the data provided;
• analysing the results of the searches, through combining these results with other available information or intelligence;
• distributing the results of the searches (without further analysis) or the results of the analyses to authorised recipients; implementing an appropriate data protection regime, including applicable retention times, logging obligations, handling requests for access, correction and deletion, etc.

These core functions would need to be laid down in appropriate legal instruments at the EU level, at the national level, or at both levels, depending on the option chosen.

4. KEY PRINCIPLES WHEN CONSIDERING AVAILABLE OPTIONS
In addition to considerations with respect to the core functions outlined above, the choice between the available options will depend to a large extent on the way in which they deliver on a number of key issues, which are currently considered in the Impact Assessment and discussed further below.
4.1. Effectiveness
The expected effectiveness of the different options in meeting the core goal of combating terrorism and its financing is a key factor. Options which increase possibilities for data sharing and analysis at the international level should be favoured from this perspective, since such data sharing and analysis will increase the effectiveness and provide more added value. In particular, the choice of the organisation(s) which will be entrusted with the analysis of the data, as well as providing the results of the analysis to the appropriate authorities, will have a significant impact on the overall effectiveness of the system, as well as on the amount of data that will be transferred. Even so, in accordance with current practice, Member States should continue to have full control over whether their information or intelligence can be shared with other authorities.
4.2. Data protection
The international sharing and analysis of information and intelligence can only take place within a robust and well developed data protection framework. The effectiveness of such a framework is not only dependent on the applicable legal provisions, enabling data subjects to exercise their rights such as judicial redress, but also on the availability of experienced personnel, such as an independent data protection officer and an independent and experienced data protection control authority. Some of the organisations which could be involved in the possible establishment of an EU TFTS already have such structures in place, whereas for others these would need to be established. Therefore, the data protection implications of each of the different options must be carefully assessed in accordance with the overarching
principles concerning the respect of fundamental rights referred to under Part 2 of this Communication.
4.3. Data security
Robust data protection provisions need to be combined with state of the art data security infrastructure and technology. Data security considerations point in the direction of limiting the number of sites where the provided data can be processed, as well as limiting any form of outside access to the data. The most secure solution would be storage at one location with no outside access. Most of the organisations which could be involved in running the TFTS already have secure data processing technologies in place, but not all currently have the capacity to handle data classified beyond the level of EU Restricted.
4.4. Data storage
Data storage could take place either at the national or EU level. At the EU level, storing the data received from the designated provider(s) could take place at Europol or at another EU body, such as the Agency for the operational management of large-scale IT systems in the area of freedom, security and justice (IT Agency)7, which is in the process of being set up. Since data storage is inextricably linked to the issues of data protection and data security, the choice for the organisation responsible for storing the data should be closely linked to the data protection and data security regime which these organisations can offer.

4.5. Making use of existing structures and instruments
All options should make use of existing structures as far as possible. This limits costs, and makes it possible to profit from experience gained, as well as from existing infrastructure. Such use of existing instruments demands that the new tasks attributed to an existing organisation fit well with the existing mandate of that organisation. For example, Europol, Eurojust or national judicial authorities may be considered to play the role of verifying and authorising the requests to provide data addressed to the designated provider(s).
4.6. Cooperation between responsible authorities
The options outlined below offer varying degrees of cooperation and sharing of information and intelligence between national authorities, and between national and European authorities. Different Member States have established different ways in which their national authorities cooperate in combating terrorism, and any action at the European level must respect the limitations established by Article 72 TFEU concerning the prerogatives of Member States
with regard to the maintenance of law and order and the safeguarding of internal security. Any EU TFTS must therefore allow for a significant level of control by the Member States of the information and intelligence they are willing to share within the context of such a system. Different approaches to this issue have been developed by a number of the organisations referred to below, some of which could be made directly applicable to the system to be
established.
4.7. First general overview of the posible financial impact of the different options
The overall costs of establishing an EU TFTS, and their distribution between the EU and the national level will depend to a large extent on the choice of policy option. Costs will in any case involve:

• costs related to the secure transfer and storage of the data received from the designated provider(s);
• costs related to the development and maintenance of the software necessary for running the searches and providing search results;
• costs related to distributing the search results or analyses to authorised recipients;
• personnel costs for staff running the searches and analysis and distributing the results;
• personnel costs for staff responsible for monitoring and audit functions;
• personnel costs for staff responsible for data protection and citizen’s rights.

Although detailed cost estimates are not yet available at this stage, initial calculations indicate that the costs of the purely EU approach and all the different hybrid options discussed below would be in the range of 33-47 million Euro initial set-up costs, with an additional 7-11 million Euro required for annual running costs. Different options are described below under Part 6 of this Communication. Option 3 would be the most expensive option, with €43 million
set-up costs for the EU and €3,7 for the Member States (combined), and €4,2 million annual running costs for the EU and €6.8 million for the Member States (combined). Option 2 would be the cheapest option, with €33 million setup costs for the EU, and €3,5 million annual running costs at EU level, as well as €3,3 million annual running costs for the Member States (combined). Option 1 would require €40,5 million for EU set up costs, and €4 million annual running costs at the EU level, as well as €5 million for annual running costs for the Member States (combined). Naturally, such costs will be reduced if use can be made of staff of existing organisations, or use can be made of existing infrastructures, as well as soft- and hardware. Costs for setting up and running a purely national system would be significantly higher (390 million set-up costs, 37 million annual running costs), since all Member States would be required to set up highly secure data processing systems and employ personnel to run the system. These amounts are preliminary and will have to be further analysed and detailed in the light of the outcome of the Impact Assessment.
5. ISSUES TO BE CONSIDERED
Irrespective of the choice between the different options for establishing and running an EU TFTS, a number of relevant questions need to be considered with respect to the scope of a possible EU TFTS. These are discussed below.
5.1. Terrorism and its financing or broader?
Access to financial messaging data is not only useful to combat terrorism and its financing. There is little doubt that such access would also be a valuable tool for combating other forms of serious crime, in particular organised crime and money laundering. However, within the context of the EU-US TFTP Agreement, considerations of proportionality have led to a scrupulously maintained limitation of the use of the data to the purposes of combating terrorism and its financing. The preliminary discussions which have so far taken place indicate that there is a wide-spread consensus that such considerations of proportionality also point in the direction of establishing the same limited scope for a European equivalent system, in line with the general considerations concerning the respect of fundamental rights discussed
in Part 2 of this Communication.
5.2. More than one provider?
The EU-US TFTP Agreement is currently limited to requesting data from only one provider of international financial messaging services. Although this provider is clearly the most important world-wide provider of such messaging services, other providers operate on the market as well. Considerations of efficiency and creating a level playing field for all players on the market point in the direction of creating a system which will be applicable to all providers of international financial messaging services. In any case, the administrative burden for companies providing financial messaging services must be taken into consideration in the choice of the available options.
5.3. Only international messaging services or also national?
The EU-US TFTP Agreement is currently limited to requesting data only from providers of international financial messaging services, i.e. messaging services used for effecting transnational transactions, including those between EU Member States but with the exclusion of financial messaging data related to the Single Euro Payments Area (SEPA). An EU TFTS will need to consider also the option of including or not financial messaging services exchanged between Member States or whether it will be limited to international exchange of financial messaging services. Purely national financial messaging services (which are used only in the context of national financial transactions) are currently excluded from the scope of the EU-US TFTP Agreement. Access to such national financial messaging services would be
of interest in order to combat terrorism and other forms of crime. However, even leaving aside the question whether access to such purely national transactions should be regulated at European level, preliminary discussions confirmed the view that such access is widely considered to be disproportionate, and should therefore be excluded from the scope of an EU system.
5.4. What type of financial messaging data should be covered?
There are many different types of financial messaging data used in the international banking system. The EU-US TFTP Agreement is currently limited to one particular type of financial messaging data. Access to other types of financial messaging data would be of interest in order to combat terrorism and its financing, and possibly other forms of crime. However, also with respect to this choice, considerations of proportionality and respect of fundamental rights
of citizens point towards limiting the scope of the messaging types to be covered by the system. Further details on this technical issue will be included in the Impact Assessment.
6. OPTIONS FOR AN EU TFTS
The options described below are currently being examined by the Commission as part of the ongoing Impact Assessment. They are not necessarily limitative and do not in any case prejudge the final Impact Assessment or choice that would be made by the Commission on its basis.
One of the options which is always considered in the process of preparing new initiatives and their accompanying Impact Assessments is the option to stick to the status quo – which in this case would mean to leave the EU-US TFTP Agreement in place, and not come forward with any proposal for an EU TFTS. This option would not reply to the call from Council and Parliament on the Commission to come forward with a proposal to submit “a legal and technical framework for extraction of data on EU territory” referred to in Part 1 of this Communication. In addition, this option would not contribute to limiting the amount of personal data transferred to third countries and it would not provide for the processing of data on EU territory, subject to EU data protection principles and legislation. The other options
discussed in more detail below all present possible ways to establish an EU TFTS. In theory, all of the core functions of an EU TFTS identified under Part 3 of this Communication could be implemented either at the EU level or at the national level. The functions can also be attributed to one or more different organisations, in line with their existing responsibilities, or new organisations could be created to perform them. Such organisations could either be European or national organisations. This implies that – also in theory – an exclusively European approach is possible, where all core functions would be attributed to EU level organisations, just as well as an exclusively national approach, where
all functions would be performed at the national level. In a general sense, it should also be kept in mind that the choices for a centralised, decentralised or hybrid system in this particular case are not necessarily the same as the choices made with respect to other initiatives involving data processing to combat terrorism and organised crime – each initiative in this area should be judged on its own merits. Both purely centralised and purely national approaches have significant drawbacks. For example, an exclusively European approach would surely suffer from a disconnect with the
law enforcement and intelligence organisations and practices of the Member States, and therefore not be very effective. Without input from the national authorities responsible for dealing with these issues, it would be almost impossible to accurately determine which categories of data would need to be requested from the designated provider(s). The usefulness of the system would also be diminished if queries of the database would take place only on the basis of intelligence available at the EU level – at the current level of EU integration, such intelligence is to a large extent only available at the national level. Also, Member States are unlikely to accept such a purely EU level approach, since it would not offer added value to their own efforts to combat terrorism and its financing. During consultations, the Member states also indicated that this option would be politically hard to accept for legal and operational reasons.
At the other extreme, a purely national approach would run the risk of a diverging implementation in the different Member States, and an increased risk of breaches of data security, due to the need to have 27 different copies of the provided data. A purely national approach would also imply difficulties with respect to the implementation of a harmonised data protection framework, as well as a harmonised approach to (the control of) other necessary restrictions, such as the limitation to terrorism and its financing. Also, with a purely national approach it is unclear which Member State would be responsible for handling requests for searches from third countries, and the added benefit of an analysis of the search results at the European level would be lost. In addition, as indicated above, the costs
associated with this option would be significantly higher, since all Member States would be required to set up highly secure data processing systems and employ personnel to run the system. The preparatory work with stakeholders therefore quickly established that the solutions at the extreme ends of the spectrum of possible options were not supported – a consensus emerged that a hybrid solution, which entails distributing the different functions over different organisations at the EU and the national level, was most likely to offer the best possible results on the two main goals. Although this consensus helps in identifying the most suitable option, the hybrid approach still presents a large number of choices to be made. The sections below describe the three hybrid options which emerged from the current preparatory work as the most plausible ones in a bit more detail – the options are also presented in tabular form in the Annex.
6.1. The EU TFTS coordination and analytical service (option 1)
This option would involve establishing an EU central TFTS unit, with most of the tasks and functions being implemented at the EU level. Issuing requests for “raw” data to the Designated Providers(s), verification of these requests, handling requests for searches and running them, managing search results and forwarding reports to those who requested searches would all take place at the EU level. However, preparing the requests to Designated Provider(s) could take place in consultation with the responsible authorities of the Member States, and the Member States could also opt to second their own analysts to the central unit to participate in the running of searches. Contrary to the fully centralised option, Member States could request searches to be run on their behalf, similar to the current procedure in
place with the US TFTP, or to be run by their own analysts. Member States would need to share information with the EU central TFTS unit, to ‘substantiate’ the request and its nexus to terrorism before a search could be initiated, or have
their requests “pre-authorised” by national authorities. Such national authorities could be for example national counter-terrorism prosecutors or investigating judges – if they would authorise a particular search on the provided data then the EU central TFTS unit could accept to run such searches without further verification. In that scenario no further intelligence would need to be provided to the EU central TFTS unit. The EU central TFTS unit would forward
the results of searches and their analysis, and could also provide information spontaneously. The U.S. and other third countries would also need to request the running of searches, following a similar process. Monitoring compliance with safeguards and controls would also be centralised, possibly involving oversight by external stakeholders, for example representing the Designated Provider(s) and those appointed as independent overseers. Data protection, integrity and
security would also be ensured at the central level. The key bodies involved in the system could be Europol and Eurojust. The tasks to be executed by Europol and Eurojust must in that case be in line with their missions as
established by the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). Also, it will need to be established to what extent the legal instruments currently regulating their functioning will need to be amended. If Europol were to be chosen as the EU central TFTS authority, it would also deal with requests by data subjects for access, rectification and
blocking, all in accordance with its existing legal framework and data protection provisions. The EU central TFTS unit would perform its role in accordance with the existing legal framework, and cases of redress and appeals would equally be dealt with in accordance with existing legal provisions. At national level, national law enforcement authorities would be involved for verifying and authorising requests for searches. The possibility of creating new national bodies could be envisaged, but this choice would best be left to the Member States on the basis of the subsidiarity principle.
6.2. The EU TFTS extraction service (option 2)
As under the first policy option, this one would involve establishing an EU central TFTS unit, whose tasks would comprise issuing requests for “raw” data to the Designated Providers(s), verification of these requests, running searches, and handling requests for searches. However, under this option, the EU TFTS unit would not be allowed to analyse the search results and compare them with other available information or intelligence when such searches are made at the request of the authorities of the Member States – in such cases its role would be limited to preparing and distributing search results in a presentable manner. At this stage, the consequences for the budgets of the EU agencies which might play a role in the implementation of the system are not yet known. As under the option 1, requests for “raw” data to be issued to the Designated Provider(s) would be prepared in close consultation with the Member States, who could make their specific needs known to the central TFTS unit, which would analyse these and formulate the
request(s) based on that analysis. Member States authorities would request searches to be run on their behalf. The extent to which such requests are substantiated and have a nexus to terrorism would be verified and validated at national level. The EU central TFTS unit would run the search and return the full set of results, organised in a presentable manner, to the Member States. The Member States authorities would be the only ones to undertake the analysis of the searches, and they could also opt for spontaneous provision of information. The EU central TFTS unit would be charged with conducting searches and analysing the results on behalf of EU institutions, the US and other third countries. It could also spontaneously provide information on that basis. As under the previous options, monitoring compliance with safeguards and controls would be centralised, possibly involving oversight by external stakeholders, for example representing the Designated Provider(s) and those appointed as independent overseers. Data protection, data integrity and data security would also be ensured at the central level. Again like under the previous option, the key bodies involved in the system could be Europol and Eurojust. At national level, the key bodies involved would be national law enforcement or intelligence authorities. As before, the creation of new national bodies would be left to the Member States on the basis of the subsidiarity principle. Europol and/or the national units would deal with requests by EU citizens for access, rectification and deletion, involving both national Data Protection Authorities and Europol’s Joint Supervisory Body. Cases of redress and appeals would be dealt with in accordance with applicable legal provisions at the national or EU level.
6.3. The Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) coordination service (option 3)
This policy option would involve the establishment of an upgraded FIU Platform, made up of all the FIUs of the Member States. The ad-hoc EU level authority would issue requests for “raw” data to the Designated Provider(s), by compiling the needs specified by the FIUs into a single request, which would also be verified and authorised at central level. Each FIU would be responsible for running searches and managing search results on behalf of its Member State, as well as for carrying out analyses and forwarding reports to those it considers relevant. The extent to which searches are substantiated and have a nexus to terrorism would be verified and validated at national or EU level. The FIUs would also be responsible for the spontaneous provision of information. The upgraded FIU Platform would be able to conduct searches and analyse the results on behalf of EU institutions and other third countries with which the EU will have concluded an agreement. It could also provide information spontaneously. Monitoring compliance with safeguards and controls would be centralised, possibly involving oversight by external stakeholders, for example representing the Designated Provider(s) and those appointed as independent overseers. Data protection, integrity and security would also be ensured at the central level. The upgraded FIU Platform would be conferred a formal legal status with clearly defined roles and responsibilities. At national level, the key bodies involved would be the FIUs and
national law enforcement and intelligence authorities. An EU level authority would handle requests by EU citizens for access, rectification and deletion, with cases of redress and appeals dealt with in accordance with applicable legal
provisions at the national or EU level.
7. CONCLUSION
On the basis of the preparatory work taken forward by the Commission so far, and subject to the results of the Impact Assessment, this Communication describes the different possible options for the establishment of a “legal and technical framework for extraction of data on EU territory” in the context of a terrorist finance tracking system. The different options identified in this Communication show that important choices and decisions will still need to be made, including as regards the respect of fundamental rights, and many legal, technical, organisational and financial issues will need to be addressed in much more detail in the course of further preparatory work. Given these significant challenges, the Commission considers that sufficient time is needed for further preparatory work and for debate with Council and Parliament.

The Parliament has issued a press release and the Sköne Oke blog commented it. I have also left my comments there (which I encourage you to read) but had not seen the full adopted text at that time. This is why I provide more information here. For background information on the SWIFT deal as such, please see my previous posts.

I  also encourage you to read a recent post on EurActiv.com (especially the part what Malmström said – at the end) and a letter from myself that has been posted to EurActiv.com.

“I know this [bulk data] is a great concern for the European Parliament, but without it there would be no TFTP (Terrorism Finance Tracking Programme)” [Commission Malmström]

In principle the new conditions from the European Parliament (see adopted text below) go in the right directions. But there are a few points that make them in total worthless. Here is why:

• Point 12 clearly is the main problem: basically it says that if the Parliaments conditions cannot be met, then the Commission should still try to put as many safeguards as possible into the agreement. The Commission will be thankful for this point as it clearly allows them to ignore all other points. I wonder: has the Parliament not learned it’s lesson in February? Was it not clear that it can only win this negotiations if it clearly says no and doesn’t provide any whole in the conditions?
• Instead of requesting reciprocity it just explains what it would mean. Come one, powerful negotiation terms look different.
• The parts on judicial oversight (point 10) and redress (point 18) are very weak. No conditions are set in the text on how the MEPs want EU citizens to be able to act against their (potentially unlawful) processing of data.

Here is the full text which has been adopted by the European Parliament on 5 May 2010:

1. Welcomes the new spirit of cooperation demonstrated by the Commission and the Council and their willingness to engage with Parliament, taking into account their Treaty obligation to keep Parliament immediately and fully informed at all stages of the procedure; reiterates its openness to an agreement which would help both Europe and the United States strengthen their fight against terrorism in the interests of the security of their citizens, without undermining the rule of law;

2. Counts on a continuation of the commitment, spirit of constructive cooperation and fairness demonstrated by representatives of the US Government in the run-up to Parliament’s vote on 11 February 2010 and thereafter;

3. Recalls its strong determination to fight terrorism and its conviction that the framework of transatlantic cooperation for counter-terrorism purposes should be further developed and improved; believes, at the same time, that European legal requirements for the fair, proportionate and lawful processing of personal information are of paramount importance and must always be upheld;

4. Reiterates that the EU’s rules on the tracking of terrorist financing activities are based on the reporting of suspicious or irregular transactions by individual financial operators;

5. Emphasises that fundamental principles still need to be laid down by the EU stating how it will generally cooperate with the US for counter-terrorism purposes and how financial messaging data providers could be asked to contribute to this fight, or indeed more generally to the use in connection with law enforcement of data collected for commercial purposes;

6. Reiterates its emphasis on the ‘purpose limitation’ of the agreement in order to ensure that any exchange of information is strictly limited to that required for the purposes of combating terrorism and that this is done on the basis of a common definition of what constitutes ‘terrorist activity’;

7. Stresses that the principles of proportionality and necessity are key to the envisaged agreement, and points out that the problem that financial messaging data providers are unable (for technical and/or governance reasons) to search the ‘content’ of the messages, leading to the transfer of data in bulk, cannot subsequently be rectified by oversight and control mechanisms, since basic principles of data protection law have already been compromised;

8. Reiterates its opinion that bulk data transfers mark a departure from the principles underpinning EU legislation and practice, and asks the Commission and Council to address this issue properly in the negotiations, bearing in mind that the TFTP is currently designed in such a way that it does not allow for targeted data exchange; solutions should include restricting the scope of the transferred data and listing the types of data that the designated providers are able to filter and extract, as well as the types of data which may be included in a transfer;

9. Considers that the Agreement on Mutual Legal Assistance is not an adequate basis for requests to obtain data for the purposes of the TFTP, in particular because it does not apply to bank transfers between third countries and because it would, in any case, require the prior identification of a specific bank, whereas the TFTP is based on targeted searches of fund transfers; future negotiations should focus on finding a solution to make one compatible with the other;

10. Takes this view that, once a mandate has been established, a judicial public authority should be designated in the EU with the responsibility to receive requests from the United States Treasury Department; points out that it is crucial that the nature of this authority and the judicial oversight arrangements should be clearly defined;

11. Urges the Council and Commission, therefore, to explore ways of establishing a transparent and legally sound procedure for the authorisation of the transfer and extraction of relevant data as well as for the conduct and supervision of data exchanges; emphasises that such steps are to be taken in full compliance with the principles of necessity and proportionality and the rule of law with full respect for fundamental rights requirements under EU law, by giving a role to a European authority, which would make it possible for relevant European legislation to become fully applicable;

12. Insists, if the above arrangements are not feasible in the short term, on a twin-track approach which differentiates between, on the one hand, the strict safeguards to be included in the envisaged EU-US agreement, and, on the other, the fundamental longer term policy decisions that the EU must address; emphasises once again that any agreement between the EU and the US must include strict implementation and supervision safeguards, monitored by an appropriate EU-appointed authority, on the day-to-day extraction of, access to and use by the US authorities of all data transferred to them under the agreement;

13. In this respect, points out that the option offering the highest level of guarantees would be to allow for the extraction of data to take place on EU soil, in EU or Joint EU-US facilities, and asks the Commission and the Council to explore, in parallel:

- ways to phase into a medium-term solution empowering an EU judicial authority to oversee the extraction in the EU, on behalf of Member States, after a mid-term parliamentary review of the agreement;

- ways to ensure, in the meantime, that EU select personnel – from EU organs or bodies, including for example, the EDPS, or joint EU-US investigation teams – with high clearance, joins SWIFT officials in the oversight of the extraction process in the US;

14. Underlines the fact that any agreement between the EU and the US, regardless of the implementing mechanism chosen, should be limited in its duration and provide for a clear commitment on the part of both the Council and Commission to take all the measures required to devise a durable, legally sound European solution to the issue of the extraction of requested data on European soil; the agreement should also provide for evaluations and safeguard reviews by the Commission at set times during its implementation;

15. Calls for the agreement to be terminated immediately if any obligation is not met;

16. Points out that true reciprocity would require the US authorities to allow both the EU authorities and competent authorities in the Member States to obtain and use financial payment messaging and related data stored in servers in the US on the same terms as apply to the US authorities;

17. Requests that all relevant information and documents, including the underlying intelligence, must be made available for deliberations in the European Parliament, in line with the applicable rules on confidentiality, in order to demonstrate the necessity of the scheme in relation to already existing instruments; asks the Commission, further, to report regularly on the functioning of the agreement and to inform Parliament fully about any review mechanism to be set up under the said agreement;

18. Asks to be provided with full and detailed information on the specific rights of European and US citizens (e.g. access, rectification, deletion, compensation and redress) and as to whether the envisaged agreement is to safeguard ‘rights’ on a non-discriminatory basis, regardless of the nationality of any person whose data are processed pursuant to it, and requests the Commission to submit an overview of the respective rights to Parliament;

19. Expresses concern that the commercial position of one specific financial messaging provider has been – and will continue to be – compromised if it continues to be singled out;

20. Emphasises that the envisaged agreement must ensure that personal data extracted from the TFTP database are kept on the basis of a strictly interpreted ‘necessity’ principle and for no longer than necessary for the specific investigation or prosecution for which they are accessed under the TFTP;

21. Points out that the concept of non-extracted data is not self-evident and should thus be clarified; calls for a maximum storage period to be established, which should be as short as possible and in any case no longer than five years;

22. Stresses the importance of the principles of non-disclosure of data to third states if no specific reasons are given for a request and of disclosure of terrorist leads to third states only subject to strict conditions and appropriate guarantees, including adequacy assessment;

23. Reiterates that a binding international agreement between the EU and the US on privacy and data protection, in the context of the exchange of information for law-enforcement purposes, remains of the utmost importance;

24. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the US Congress and the Government of the United States of America.

If you have not done so, read first my post about the SWIFT agreement which I wrote in November. This week, on 11 February, the Members of the European Parliaments (MEPs) will vote on the agreement that will allow US authorities to tap into EU bank data.

Here is a list of arguments why MEPs must reject the agreement:

1) EU’s financial messaging data will be transferred in bulk

The European Parliament’s rapporteur on the SWIFT agreement, Jenine Hennis-Plasschaert, made it very clear in her report that SWIFT is actually unable to provide tailored data about individual transactions (for technical and governance reasons). This means that, in accordance with the following provision in the agreement with the USA, SWIFT will need to provide all of its data in bulk:

“If the Designated Provider [SWIFT] is not able to identify and produce the specific data that would respond to the request because of technical reasons, all potentially relevant data shall be transmitted in bulk, subject to Article 5(2), to the competent authority of the requested Member State.” (SWIFT agreement, article 4 point 6)

In other words: instead of prohibiting SWIFT to provide all of its data at once to the US authorities it expressly permits this. This should already be enough to reject the whole agreement. If the possibility to get all data exists then you can be 100% sure that the United States will use it.

2) Privacy: It’s about European business and industry and not about citizens

In the discussions about the SWIFT agreement many people mentioned the privacy concerns with regard to the banking data of European citizens. But in reality European companies and industry will be much more affected than citizens because businesses are likely the ones to have the majority of trans-border transactions running through SWIFT.

The bulk transfer of data (see above) opens the door to industrial espionage on European businesses’ financial transactions – something that the US of course will never openly admit – but can they withstand this outstanding opportunity? (The German industry federation has warned already in November about this – without success it seems.)

3) The scope of the agreement is completely unclear

Everybody talks about SWIFT but the agreement applies to all companies dealing with financial transactions. Furthermore the agreement does not specify which transactions are concerned: bank transfers to and from EU countries or also intra EU countries. Even SEPA (Euro transfers) could be affected by the agreement.

4) There is no limit in time that the US can store the SWIFT data

While in principle the agreement says that transmitted data shall be deleted no later than 5 years from receipt (article 5 l) this is on the condition that the data is “no longer necessary to combat terrorism or its financing” (article 5 i). Such a weak regulation of the retention of the data cannot be acceptable. It means that all SWIFT data could potentially be used by US administrations in decades. Five years is already much above the 2 years maximum retention used by the EU’s telecom data rentention directive.

5) There is not much evidence that the SWIFT data / TFTP programme has had major benefits in the fight against terror

The US administration claims that several terrorist leads have been shared with EU member states. But how many terrorists have been convicted? We don’t know. But I’d assume that we would know by now if there were several of them.

The European Union has assigned a person that is overseeing the SWIFT data transfers. This person is Jean-Louis Bruguière, a former judge and French conservative politician with apparently close ties to the CIA and FBI, according to Wikipedia. Bruguière has produced two reports on the implementation of the previous SWIFT agreements. These reports are classified as secret. No MEP other than rapporteur Hennis-Plasschaert has seen them.

The US administration especially stresses Germany as a country that has benefited from the TFTP programme and the searches in the SWIFT banking records. But in December last year the German Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA) critisised the SWIFT agreement and (according to an internal paper cited by Der Spiegel) is of the opinion that there is “no need” and “no operational interest” in the SWIFT data searches.

All in all not very convincing arguments for the necessity of the TFTP programme, don’t you think?

6) The EU must not outsource the terror intelligence to the USA

Maybe you don’t know this: the TFTP programme has been set up only for the purpose of accessing SWIFT data. The majority of SWIFT transactions however concerns European banks and not those of US banks.

So what has the EU done? Article 8 of the SWIFT agreement expressly permits EU Member States to request a search for relevant information. The US will do the search for the EU Member State and hand back the information. The EP rapporteur has this summary:

“It cannot be denied that the EU continues to outsource its financial intelligence service to the US.” EP comittee report, 3 February 2010

The EU’s anti-terror investigations on (largely) its own data should – if deemed necessary – be done by the EU itself. And please don’t tell me that no EU Member State has the technical capability to do searches in a large database of financial transactions.

7) This is the last chance for the European Parliament to improve things

Just step back a bit and think about what has happened: the US administration has secretly set up the TFTP programme in 2002 without informing the EU Member States. This programme was in breach of Belgian and European data protection legislation. When uncovered by US newspapers the EU Council of ministers tried to get a few assurances on the use of the data.

Then, when drafting the new interim agreement in 2009 the Council of the EU showed complete ignorance with regard to the European Parliament – ignoring the demands set out by the EP in September 2009, signing the agreement just one day before the Lisbon Treaty came into force (30 Nov 2009) and giving the Parliament one week to decide whether it agrees with it. And now MEPs are expected to rubber-stamp the agreement?

Yes, the interim agreement will only be valid until the end of October 2010 – and the European Parliament has already demanded that it will be fully involved in the negotiations. Nothing substantial has been promised. (The commission is apparently preparing some concessions, counter-check them with the above points!) Do you really think the final agreement will be very different from the interim agreement? How much negotiation power will the European Parliament have if it already agrees to the interim agreement?

The European Parliament must NOW say no to the interim agreement. Only this will give them the opportunity to be really heard and involved in the final agreement.

But apparently the US threatens now quite openly – in the case of a no – to stop EU level negotations and to make a bilateral agreement with Belgium (the seat of SWIFT): do you really say yes to something because the other party is threatening to ignore the European Union and its legislative bodies? SWIFT and European banking data is a European issue and must be dealt at European level. If necessary, European safeguards must be established for other EU Members states banking data that is stored in other EU countries. Individual Member States must not be left alone when the US (or any other Member States) is forcing them to undermine fundamental rights like data protection, privacy and trade secrets.

Many in favour are saying that only a yes will provide security to Europe. In fact they are playing with the security of European businesses and citizens. If you re-read the points above it must be impossible to say yes to such a sub-standard agreement.

Legal concerns

Finally, if this has not been yet convincing, let me give you a quick summary of other legal concerns mentioned by the EP rapporteur in her recent report:

• The TFTP must be considered “as a departure from European law and practice in how law enforcement agencies would acquire individuals’ financial records”.
• The “transfer of all, or virtually all of its data [bulk transfer] [...] violates the basic principles of [EU] data protection law”.
• The SWIFT agreement “does not expressly provide that transfer requests be subject to judicial authorisation”.
• The conditions for sharing SWIFT data with third-party countries are “not sufficiently defined”.
• Access, rectification, compensation and redress outside the EU are “not defined adequately”.
• The Council “failed to clarify the precise role of the ‘public authority’” with the responsibility to handle the requests from the USA.

Background documents:

• SWIFT agreement – published in EU Official Journal on 13 January 2010
• EP Civil liberties, Justice and Home Affairs Committee’s recommendation to say to SWIFT agreement (3 February 2010)
• Rules on processing of SWIFT data (2007) – [if you read carefully you will see a 8 pages full of blabla]
• European Parliament legal service opinion on SWIFT agreement

These are the 5 reasons:

• There is no reciprocity: The US will receive EU banking data and the EU will NOT receive any US banking data. Basically the EU will outsource a data mining center to the US authorities and hopes to get back some interesting data on its own citizens.
• The bank data won’t stay in the United States: The transferred data is able to move outside the US for anti-terrorism mesaures. Given how many countries cooperate on anti-terrorism this is very worrying.
• No parliaments to be involved: neither the European Parliament nor any national parliment will be involved.
• No courts involved: no courts are involved before the transfer of data takes place. There is no possibility for European citizens or businesses to launch legal procedures against the data transfers. Compared to the data retention directive concercing telecom operations (which was heavily discussed in the European parliament, in media and at national levels) this is very very weak.
• Everything is done in completele secrecy: There is no press release, no memo. The draft agreement is not public and held secret until today. Hence there is very little media coverage, especially outside Germany.

Background of the deal

It’s everything about SWIFT, a company that handles the bank transactions for thousands of bank, inluding most European banks. SWIFT is based in Belgium but has also a branch in the USA. Under the TFTP programme the US government forced the US branch (which mirrors all data based in Belgium) to allow government access to all these bank transactions in order to help anti-terrorism operations.

SWIFT is now moving all its data centers outside the EU and the US, to Switzerland. In order to continue allowing the US authorities accessing all banking data a high level agreement between the EU and the USA is currently being negotiated. It is likely to be agreed on in the EU council of minister meeting next Monday, 30 November 2009.

Why is the SWIFT deal dangerous?

The move of SWIFT the data server to Switzerland would be an excellent opportunity to stop the nearly unlimited access of US authorities on EU bank transactions. But EU justice and interior minister are apparently keen agree a deal as soon as possible, on 30 November. Why 30 November? Because one day later, on 1 December 2009, the EU’s Lisbon Treaty will be in force and would allow the European Parliament to play a major role in the negotiations of the deal with the USA. A deal one day before will be a slap in the face of democracy in the EU.

SWIFT handles 15 mio bank transactions daily for more than 9000 banks worldwide. Nearly every transnational bank transaction within the EU is recorded in the SWIFT data centers, including amount, sender, recipient, and transaction comments. The agreement will even allow to transmit “other personal data”.

This will allow US authorities to establish a huge data mining database, allowing to query every substantial business link within the EU. No question that the United States will never admit that openly. But data protection agreements should not be based on hope but on principles. The current draft is based on hope.

Is there no opposition to the deal?

When German media reported about the deal about 2 weeks ago some opposition to the deal was raised. Germany, France and Austria seem to had important data protection concerns. Finally it was reported that Germany would even block the deal. Two weeks later all the opposition apparently has disappeared and Germany will now abstain from the vote on Monday, paving the way for the agreement coming into force.

MEPs in the European Parliament have raised concerns as well, but if the deal is agreed before 1st December, there will be no way for them to have a say.

No reciprocity

The most suprising fact related to the EU negotiations with the US is the missing demand of reciprocity. In other words: while the US will be able to access EU banking data no access to US banking data by EU auhtoirties is being foreseen.

Open questions

It is unclear to me what exact legal form the agreement with the United States will have. To my knowledge it will probably not require any ratification by national parliaments. It needs to be seen whether procedures against the deal will be able to be launched at the European Court of Justice. They could potentially be based on the EU’s current, rather strict data protection legislation.

Documents

• Draft SWIFT agreement (EU council document, prepared by Swedish presidency)
• TFTP – Draft EU-US agreement – Q/A (unclear source of paper)

I am very interested in your opinion on this topic. Please use the comments below.

Update: See also this follow-up article before the vote of the MEPs on 11 February 2010.

Updates

Thursday 26 Nov at 14:00: Pressure grows on opponents of bank transfer data deal (European Voice)

Thursday 26 Nov at 22:00: Facebook group against SWIFT data transfer deal

Friday, 27 Nov at 09:00: Follow-up post: 5 reasons why the SWIFT deal is very bad for Europe

The official line of the Socialist & Democrats Group was to abstain in the vote on the Commission President. Asked on Twitter how he voted, German Social Democrat MEP Matthias Groote answered yesterday afternoon that he did not support Barroso. He did not want to clarify whether this meant that he voted no or that he abstained, saying that the vote was secret and that he respects that.

Now it is his perfect right not to disclose his personal choice in a secret ballot. I would even say that it is remarkable that an MEP takes the time to answer and explain on Twitter his reasons why and how he voted on a certain issue.

But I want to take this as a starting point to ask two questions:

• Is a secret ballot adequate for electing a European Commission President?
• What is the reasoning behind the abstention of Socialist MEPs in the Barroso vote?

The secret ballot

The vote on the Commission President is cast by a secret ballot, in accordance with the EU Treaties.

The key aim [of a secret ballot] is to ensure the voter records a sincere choice by forestalling attempts to influence the voter by intimidation or bribery. (Wikipedia)

Now I have to admit that I have no idea of the practice of using secret ballots in the European Parliament or national parliaments. So far, I haven’t noticed any votes in the EP that were secret, with the exception of the vote on the President of the European Parliament.

One the one hand I think that the aim of the secret ballot described above holds also true for important votes in the EP. MEPs of a certain political group could be (or could fear to be) intimidated and could face some pressure to vote with their political family in case their vote would be made public.

One the other hand it is exactly the Commission and its President that many people in Europe describe as not having the required democratic legitimacy that it should have. Does it improve or hinder democracy when the directly elected MEPs cast their vote on the Commission President in a secret ballot. I don’t know enough about parliamentary principles to make up my mind. Would be interesting to hear your opinion on it.

The role of the Socialist in the Barroso vote

The official line of the Socialist MEPs was to abstain from the vote on the Commission President. Now you could say that this is the only realistic option for the S&D group as they had no own candidate and no majority in the EP to prevent Barroso remaining at the head of the European Commission.

But why not simply voting against Barroso? If the headline of the S&D Group website after the vote was “Weakest Commission President in history” then I think it would have been consequent to vote no. Such a headline suggests that the Socialists feel more in opposition than in a constructive dialogue about key policies of the Commission, something Tony Robinson, Head of Press and Communications of the S&D Group, wanted to stress in another tweet yesterday:

“People wrongly think today’s Barroso vote is the end of the affair. The big vote comes later on the new Commission and its policies.”

Now it is difficult for me to understand how it will be possible for the Socialist MEPs to influence key policies of the new Commission when they have no alliance with others to block the whole Commission. Does really anyone think that the center-left political groups in the EP will build up an alliance to reject the entire new Commission based on reservations about not being “social” enough? Yes, there was the issue of Buttiglione in 2004, but this only is an option for rather extreme cases, not “influencing policies”.

The irony in all this is: 117 MEPS abstained in the vote. 382 voted for and 219 against Barroso. As the vote was secret we don’t know how each MEP voted. All comments suggest that the abstentions come from the Socialists and that the yes votes are all from EPP, Liberal and ECR Group. But we don’t know. Maybe Barroso has convinced several Greens in their public hearing? Or there are Liberals that abstained rather than voting for Barroso. So how will Barroso know who really supported him?

There is one further interesting remark by a Poul Rasmussen, President of the Party of European Socialists. In a first reaction, according to EurActiv, he said:

“For the coherence of Europe, we insist on having the post of High Representative, or if the Lisbon treaty is ratified, the European Council president. We have several excellent candidates for these positions.”

I am very interested in knowing which candidates will be put forward (and why they wouldn’t have been suitable as Commission President).

Always interested in your comments!

Note: comments are now back. Sorry for the delay, which was caused by a technical problem on Blogactiv.

I could tell dozens of such stories (and each one would be worth a blog article), but I will just explain my quest for stamps yesterday. The simple goal: post 26 letters, in standardised format, after 18:00 in Brussels’ city center (aiming for next day delivery, so with same-day pick-up still).

At 17:50, knowing that my closest post office (at city 2 shopping centre) closes at 18:00 (17:45 to be more correct as they will close doors 15 minutes before) I head directly to the large post office at De Brouckere.

Bad luck, it also closes at 18:00. Arriving there at 17:55 the security person tells me the office is closed (which is not the problem as such here). I ask where the next open post office would be. He tells me further down Anspachlaan but couldn’t tell me exactly where. On the way back to my bike I see the post box in front of the post office stating 19:00 as last pick-up time. I return to the person at the entrance and ask whether they’d have an automatic vending machine for stamps. He says no and refers me to the press shop on the other side of the street.

The man in the press shop tells me that he doesn’t sell stamp, I would only get them at the post office (and this corresponds with my experience that you can’t buy stamps anywhere else than at post office or post partner). So why does the person at the post office send me to the press shop?

Not knowing where I could find any other open post office with pick-up time later than 18:00 I decide to cycle to the poor-man’s post office at Midi train station. I call it poor-man’s office because it often the last possibility to go for when you need to post something late and despite being located at the largest train station of Belgium it is actually more used by many people from Anderlecht, one of Brussels’ less-rich communes.

I arrive there at 18:12, take a ticket (number 989) and look at the screen. It shows 960. “Only” 29 people in front of me. While ticket systems are actually a really good invention they are so often abused in Belgium.

The number of people is misleading. The real queue is shown on the screen.

While waiting in the “queue” I discover in a corner a vending machine for stamps. However, the instructions are very clear: the machine sells only stamp per stamp and you need to insert exact cash for each stamp. Money is not returned. Paying with Proton (Belgium’s well-working electronic wallet on bank card)? No way.

After waiting 25 minutes I tell the man behind the counter I’d like 26 stamps for national standard delivery. He tells me that they are only sold per 10. I said this can’t be (knowing that I bought single stamps the day before in another post office) but he insists that I can only get 20 or 30. I decide that I don’t want to spend more time discussing pricing and packaging for my stamps and go for 30 stamps. I return home and note that it took me again 1 hour to post a few letters in Brussels. Having done this before, I was not surprised.

The story above is maybe not super exciting but it clearly shows how bad customer service can become if you have a monopoly (in this case on delivery of letters).

“A monopoly exists when a specific individual or an enterprise has sufficient control over a particular product or service to determine significantly the terms on which other individuals shall have access to it.” (Wikipedia)

I am normally not the one who cries loud for liberalisation of markets but unfortunately I have given up any hope that regulation or political pressure can still improve anything at the Belgian post. The only solution is strong competition via the European Union’s liberalisation route for postal service in Europe. and hopefully nobody needs to go still to the Belgian Post after 2011/2013 (anyone knowing the exact date of liberalisation for Belgium?).

Further questions

• Why do post office in Belgium close often at 17:00 or 18:00 while many other shops sell until 18:30, 19:00 or even 20:00? Why is there no spread of opening times among neighbouring post offices?
• Why does it cost 1,25 € or 1,30 € to send a non-standardised 50g letter from Germany or Austria to  Belgium but 2,70 € if you send the same letter from Belgium to those countries?
• Why is the cheapest rate for European countries for standard letters 90 cent in Belgium, but 70 cent in Germany and France and 65 cent in Austria?
• Why does it cost minimum 5,70 € (!) to send a registered letter in Belgium? (I spare you the country comparisons)
• Why can you get Coca Cola, coffee, bread, phone credit, public transport and your money via automatic vending machines but not stamps?
• Why can’t you buy stamps in any press shop or whoever wants to sell them? (Remember: the post makes the money at moment the stamp is sold, not when you post a letter)
• Why do Belgian stamps not carry any value (the € amount)?
• Why is it not possible in Belgium to distinguish a stamp for Belgium from a stamp for Europe? (you have to know the colours)
• Why is it possible that a post office like the one at Brussels north station is in such a bad shape, smelling like piss, and nobody cares.
• Why is it possible that management of the post accepts that its clients have to wait often 20-40 minutes before being able to use the services of the post?
• Why do I have the feeling that Belgian politicians never ever go themselves to a post office?
• Why is the post allowed to sell gas & electricty, mobile phone contracts and financial services when it can’t even deal properly with its core service clients?
• Why does nobody care about bad customer service in Belgium?

The most important for me is the waiting time. Could you image a restaurant letting each client wait for 20-40 minutes before coming to their table and would you expect those clients ever coming back to that restaurant?

Please use the comments to le us know what your experiences have had with La Poste in Brussels. I am also interested in other blog or news articles about customer service at the Belgian post (also in FR/NL).

See also: Jon Worth’s simple quest for a postage stamp

First I was surprised to see how many topics I already seem to have covered on this blog. And after looking more closely at the graphic it seems that I cover mainly professional politics online. Hmm. I somehow miss “Europe” in here. And professional EU reporting is rather done here and here.

Anyway, it might be interesting for private person and politicians like MEPs to check out their online profile.

As I pointed out in an earlier post this blog will in the future have more stuff on Brussels as a city than the EU related notion of Brussels.

By the way, here is another nice visualisation tool that exists since a while already. This is the Wordle graphic based on the Brusselsblogger feed.

To put this more into an EU context: I have taken the data available via the OECD press release, added percentages for easier comparison and removed all the non-EU countries (note that not all EU countries are OECD members, so some countries are missing).

This is the overview, based on the high-usage OECD basket (prices are USD, base August 2008):